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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, 
a Texas corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
and Crossclaim Respondent, 
vs 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No . 860413 GAIL C. POTTER and LORI 
POTTER, his wife, 
Defendants - Respondents 
and Cross Appellants. 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the issues presented on appeal are 
those three issues set forth in Appellant's Brief, and the 
additional issue presented on the Cross Appeal as to the 
entitlement of Respondents to damages . 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to award damages t 
Gail and Lori Potter for the Appellant's continuing trespass an 
use of the Respondents' property? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents, Gail and Lori Potter, purchased 5.92 acres of 
property in West Jordan to build a shopping center (R. pp 214-
215). A portion of that property is a piece approximately 87 
feet by 129 feet on the corner of 6200 South and 3655 West in 
Salt Lake County (R. p 215). Respondents received a Warranty 
Deed to the property in June, 1984 (Ex. 12) and a policy of tit 
insurance (R. p 218). The property was purchased from a 
corporation called Big Six, and the Respondents utilized a real 
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estate agent named Eva Nielsen (R. p 220) in consummating the 
transaction. The actual closing was handled for the Respondents 
by their daughter, Jana Fuca (R. p 238). 
Next to the property purchased by the Respondents is a 7-
Eleven store owned by Southland Corporation. Southland admits in 
its responsive pleadings that Mr. and Mrs. Potter own the corner 
property next to the store (R. p 49, IT 1; R. pp 126-127). 
The lot owned by the Appellant is 102 feet wide by 160 feet 
long as shown in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief at Page A-2. 
The long side of their lot lies contiguous to 6200 South 
affording Appellants 160 feet of access on a Salt Lake County 
road . 
When the Respondents purchased their property in June of 
1984, they made inquiry of a title company to search the title 
(R. p 214) and the real estate agent to inquire if 7-Eleven had 
any other rights of access (R. p 215). 
Specifically, Jana Fuca asked the realtor to check with 7-
Eleven, which she did (R. p 239; R. p 222-223). The realtor 
described the Appellant's response as: "They could not find any 
record of any entitlement of that property to them." (R. p 239). 
Appellants purchased their lot based on a contract between 
themselves and the prior owner signed July 3, 1975. (Ex. 1 ) . 
They amended their contract to change the dimensions and 
description of the lot size by a subsequent written contract 
dated March 9, 1976 (Ex. 2 ) . They received a Warranty Deed for 
the property described in Exhibit 2, which contains the metes and 
bounds description of the lot upon which they built their store. 
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None of the contracts or the Deed between Appellant and its 
grantor, make any mention of an easement purchase or grant, 
rights of ingress and egress, or other rights of access over any 
property other than that specifically described in the 
agreements . 
Mr. E. L. Pack, who was the zone manager for 7-Eleven for 18 
to 20 years, handled this purchase for the Appellants (R. p 
159). He also was responsible for between 140 to 150 other 
acquisitions during his employment (R. p 159). He testified in 
response to an inquiry of whether 7-Eleven had paid anything for 
any interest in the disputed corner parcle that: 
"At no time was that ever offered to us for sale or 
purchase (R . 181) . 
The Secretary/Treasurer of the Corporation which sold 
Southland their lot, Mr. Bob Bowles, indicated that it was never 
the Seller's intent to grant 7-Eleven access across the corner 
parcel (R. p 207). His company, in fact, had intentions of 
constructing a service station on this same property (R. p 206). 
The Appellant's brief is replete with summaries about the 
rezoning of this property (Appellant's Brief pp 5-8). All of the 
reference to Minutes of Planning and Zoning Department were 
admitted subject to a continuing objection (R. p 188) that the 
Planning Department was an advisory body under § 10-9-4 U.C.A. 
(1953, amended) and the zoning power lay only with the City 
Council pursuant to § 10-9-1 U.C.A. (1953, amended) and that 
these miscellaneous discussions were otherwise irrelevant to the 
construction and enforcement of the documents conveying title. 
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Nevertheless, the Appellants, themselves, presented into 
evidence Exhibit 7 which is a copy of the City Council of West 
Jordan's meeting regarding the zoning of the parcel in 
question. This meeting took place on December 9, 1975 which was 
after the initial contract between 7-Eleven and Big Six had been 
signed, but three and one-half months prior to the amendment (Ex. 
2 ) • 
Exhibit 7 clearly establishes that on December 9, 1975 the 
entire parcel of property now owned by 7-Eleven and the Potters 
(6.39 acres) was rezoned CN (commercial) without condition or 
exception (see attached minutes). 
Three months after the City Council meeting, Southland 
amended the sale contract to change the size of the lot (Ex. 2) 
and that agreement went on to say, in part: "In all other 
respects, said purchase agreement is hereby ratified and 
reaffirmed 
There is also one sentence upon which Appellants rely which 
is found in Exhibit 3 > thirj. "We will also want two right-
of-ways in from Dixie Drive" (R. p 175). This document was 
found not to be meaningful by the trial court for the reasons 
described below. 
Exhibit 3 was written on stationary of West Jordan City and 
dated April 11, 1976. It is not signed by anyone representing 
the City. It is not acknowledged nor is there any claim that it 
was ever recorded. The City Planner, who was employed by West 
Jordan at the time, testified that he did not even know where the 
original document was located (R. p 194) but it was not in his 
- 4 -
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files (R. p 194) and he didn't know if it was in the file of West 
Jordan because he had not seen their file (R. p 1 9 5 ) . There is 
no dispute that whatever that document (Ex. 3) was for, Mr. 
Potter never saw it (R. p 2 1 5 ) . 
There are only three documents in evidence demonstrating the 
conveyance of any interest in real property from Big Six 
Corporation to either 7-Eleven or the Potters. Exhibit 12 is a 
Warranty Deed conveying Respondents their 5.92 acres. Exhibit 1 
is the original contract whereby 7-Eleven agreed to purchase the 
lot next to Respondent's property. Exhibit 2 is simply an 
amendment of that contract changing the size of the piece of 
property which they wish to purchase. 
The Warranty Deed which 7-Eleven received was not admitted 
into evidence, but it is stipulated and agreed that it describes 
the property which they contracted to buy pursuant to the March, 
1976 amendment (Ex. 2 ) . 
During the time from the Potter's purchase of their property 
in June, 1984 to the trial in April, 1986, the Appellant 
continually trespassed on Respondent's property. Southland was 
utilizing the property continually for parking, selling cars and 
in fact painted lines on the ground (R. p 2 1 7 ) . They used the 
property without permission (R. p 2 1 7 ) . 
Mr. Potter, the owner of the property, testified the fair 
rental value for the property was from a low $2,000.00 per month 
to a high $4,000.00 per month (R. p 2 1 6 ) . The trial court 
declined to award damages for this continuing trespass (R. p 
103) . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant has no interests in the Respondents1 property. It 
never purchased any rights in the property nor has its use been 
of sufficient duration to become adverse to the record owner. 
Its claim is too obscure (being without description or duration) 
to support its claim. It has never purchased the interest 
alleged nor has any party ever conveyed it to it. 
The Appellant admits using the Respondents1 land for 22 
months without right or permission. Respondents are entitled to 
reimbursement for the value of that use. 
POINT I . 
Gail And Lori Potter Are The Fee Simple 
Owners Of The Property In Question And 
Appellant Has No Interest In Nor Access Over It 
The history of the purchase of the contiguous parcel of 
property can be summarized concisely. On July 3, 1979, 7-Eleven 
signed a contract (Ex. 1) to buy a lot from Big Six 
Corporation. That contract was never recorded (R. p 179) but it 
contained a legal description of certain property. In March, 
1976, the contract was amended to insert a different legal 
description (Ex. 2 ) . That agreement was never recorded but a 
Warranty Deed for the property described therein was recorded in 
approximately April, 1976. 
Southland Corporation constructed a convenience store on 
their property, but they have also been using the adjacent corner 
parcel which is not described in any of the documents and was not 
purchased because it wasn't offered for sale (R. p 181). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mr, and Mrs. Potter purchased the property next to the 7-
Eleven store in June, 1984. They investigated both the recorded 
title and inquired about 7-Elevenfs use of the corner. There 
being no documents, recorded interest, long-term uses or other 
asserted rights, they completed the purchase of the property and 
received a Warranty Deed and a Title Policy. 
There is no dispute that both Deeds (7-Elevenfs and 
Potter's) set forth the legal description of the property 
described in their respective sale documents. 
There is no recorded and/or written document conveying or 
reserving any interest in the parcel to Appellant. It is 
submitted that Appellant is simply attempting to obtain, for 
free, that which they never purchased. 
Section 57-1-6 U.C.A. (1953, amended) states: 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument 
in writing setting forth an agreement to convey any rea 
estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or 
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by 
this title and recorded in the office of the county in 
which such real estate is situated . . ." 
Futher, § 57-2-1 U.C.A. (1953, amended) states: 
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is 
conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged or 
proved and certified in the manner herein provided." 
and the Statute of Frauds found at § 25-5-3 U.C.A. (1953) 
mandates that a contract for the sale of real property be 
subscribed by the party granting the conveyance. 
Also, § 57-3-3 U.C.A. (1953, amended) further protects 
Respondent: 
- 7 -
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"Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which 
shall not be recorded as provided in this Title, shall 
be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration of the same 
estate, or any portion thereof, where his own conveyance 
shall be first duly recorded." 
There is simply no document, promise, or contract which 
gives 7-Eleven the rights they assert over the Respondents' 
property. In fact, their own agent, Mr. Pack, testified that he 
knew the property wasn't for sale (R. p 181). 
In addition to the lack of any written or oral agreement or 
contract for the corner property and the complete absence of any 
conveyance of any interest thereto, there was no consideration. 
Where there is no consideration given, a document (if there was 
one) is in and of itself invalid to convey any interest in real 
property. Gold Oil Land Development Corporation v. Davis, Utah, 
611 P.2d 711 (1980). If Appellant actually contends that the 
Exhibit 3 document could convey an interest in real property, it 
is not a valid contract nor enforceable. 
In Davidson v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2nd, 338, 517 P.2d 1026 
(1973) this Court had an opportunity to review a contract 
allowing buyers to approve the net acreage description at a 
future time. The Court held: 
"This writing constituted a mere expression of a purpose 
to make a contract in the future, for the whole matter 
was contingent on further negotiations . The trial court 
erred in its conclusion that the writing constituted a 
valid, enforceable contract." 
If one could, by any stretch of the imagination, see Exhibit 
3 as a contract, it is certainly only an expression to make a 
future contract. Also, Exhibit 3 contains no property 
description whatsoever nor any terms of sale. It is overly vague 
- 8 -
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and unenforceable • Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2nd 368, 423 
P .2d 491 (1967). The trial court determined this document to be 
meaningless. 
POINT II . 
There Is No Implied Easement Across 
Mr. And Mrs. Potter's Property 
It appears that Appellants are attempting to impress upon 
the property which was purchased by the Potters, an easement 
which they could not buy nor acquire by useage . They contend 
that there is an implied easement and cite general language from 
the Restatement of Property concerning the philosophy behind such 
easements that are also known as "ways of necessity". 
The authority cited by the Appellant in Savage v. Nielsen, 
114 Utah 22, 197 P .2d 117 (1948) concisely states that the 
purpose and philosophy behind the "way of necessity" is to 
prevent people from dividing property into many parcels and 
selling those parcels without providing reasonable access. In 
Savage, supra the Court recognized that reasonable access or 
right-of-way must be provided to a party where: 
"The physical location of the other tract is such that 
it is not reasonably accessible without crossing the 
tract conveyed away." (at pg. 121) 
It is not the case, however, that Appellant purchased or acquired 
any property rights in the adjoining property in this instance. 
It is also not the case that they lack access to their 
property. They abut a county road the entire length of their 
property and have 160? of public access. 
- 9 -
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The Appellant's authority does not support a "way of 
necessity". Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 
(1947) is an action in which the Court, at Page 270, specificall 
stated that it was not a case where innocent parties had been 
mislead by the public records. This was a suit that determined 
various rights created between all the parties who knew or shoul 
have known that there were rights in existence at the time of 
sale but which were not reflected by the public records. In tha 
case, an obvious irrigation ditch which had been used to provide 
water to one of the parcels of properties for over 30 years was 
destroyed and there was no alternative available. It is simply 
inapposite to the facts in this action. 
Appellant's reliance on the Restatement of Property (1T476 p 
2977) deletes crucial factors which are set forth to be 
considered by the Court in determining the existence of a "way o 
necessity." Those factors are: 
(a) Whether claimant is the conveyor or conveyee 
(b) The terms of conveyance 
(c) The consideration given 
(d) Whether the claim was made against a simultaneous 
conveyee; 
(e) The extent of necessity; ' * • 
(f) Whether reciprocal benefits result to conveyor and 
convyee; 
(g) The manner in which the land was used prior to its 
conveyance; 
- 10 -
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(h) The extent to which the prior use was or might have 
been known to the parties. 
In summary there is simply no basis to conceive of a "way of 
necessity" across a contiguous property since it is not necessary 
for access or use of the Appellant's property; did not exist 
prior to their purchase, there was no consideration given for it, 
they have never asserted it until now; and, the trial court 
established that the evidence simply did not support such a 
contention. 
POINT III. 
The Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law and 
Judgment In This Case Accurately Set Forth 
The Findings Of The Court 
Respondent is confused as to what deficiency Appellant 
contends exists in the Findings of Fact, especially in light of 
the fact that no objection was ever raised at the trial court 
level as to any supposed inadequacy, nor was any request made to 
amend or supplement those Findings. 
The Appellant's Amended Complaint sets forth their entire 
causes of action as to any property interests in Mr, Potter's 
land in Paragraph 4 (R. p 39). The rest of the Amended 
Complaint is addressed to the legal description of the property 
and the Appellant's need for a Restraining Order or Injunction. 
That paragraph states: 
"Plaintiff has and claims an easement and right of 
ingress and egress over and across the property owned by 
Defendants Potters for its customers and other 
invitees. Said easement and right of ingress and egress 
arise both by express agreement with the predecessor in 
interest of Defendants Potters and by implication. It 
has been used as such for a period in excess of 9 
- 11 -
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years. Such agreement runs with the land and binds 
Defendants Potters who have both actual and constructive 
notice of Plaintiff's rights in said property and its 
rights to use the same for ingress and egress to its 7-
Eleven s tore . " 
Upon completion of the trial the trial court, in regards to 
the allegation set forth in Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint 
made the following Findings of Fact (R. p 99): 
"4. Plaintiff's claim of an easement across property 
purchased by the Defendant is without basis in that the 
Plaintiff acquired no property rights to cross this 
property, there is no recorded document conveying any 
easement or property rights to the Plaintiff to use or 
cross the Defendants' property and the parties have 
admitted that there was no written conveyance or 
recordable instrument conveying any property rights to 
the contiguous property purchased by the Defendants. 
Further, no consideration was exchanged for any property 
interest in the property owned by the Defendants." 
It is submitted to this Court that complete, adequate 
Findings in accordance with the laws of this State have been 
entered and Appellant is simply grasping at straws in an attempt 
to find something upon which to base their appeal. 
Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d 1336 (1979), cited by 
Appellants states at page 1338; 
"To that end the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." 
In this instance there were two claims: (1) a "way of 
necessity" and (2) an agreement. The trial court specifically 
found that neither claim had any merit and the findings establish 
the basis in a clear and distinct manner. 
POINT IV . 
Respondents Should Be Entitled To An Award 
Of Damages For The Continuing Trespass By The Appellants 
The evidence is uncontradicted that Appellants and their 
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customers have been utilizing the Respondents' property 
continually since its purchase in 1984 (R. p 119). That use was 
totally unauthorized (R. p 217). The fair rental value of the 
property being used was between $2,000 and $4,000 per month. 
Utilizing the lowest figure admitted into evidence would result 
in the minimum damage of $2,000 x 22 months (June 1984 to April, 
1986) of $44,000 . 
The Respondent's testimony was admissable to support his 
damages, especially since Appellant put on no evidence 
contradicting this evidence. Williams v. Oldroyd, Utah, 581 P .2d 
561 (1978) . 
Also, since the record is undisputed that Appellant's agent, 
Mr. Pack, knew from the beginning that they never acquired this 
property (R. pp 180-181) the flagrant and willful trespass 
required the award of punitive damages. Powers v. Taylor, 14 
Utah 2d 152, 379 P .2d 380 (1963) 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed except as 
to the issue of damages which the Respondents are entitled. The 
Appellants, a huge company with extensive real estate interests, 
are trying to grab property which they never owned, for nothing, 
from an innocent third party. The attempt itself is 
reprehens ible. 
This matter should be remanded with instructions to enter 
judgment for damages in favor of Respondents for at least 
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$44,000, being the minimum value of the property Appellant has 
simply elected to use without any claim or permission. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of December, 1986. 
Ms-£2 
Robert Felton 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by United States first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, to Ralph L. Jerman and B .L . Dart 1407 West 
<K 
North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah and on the -^ day of 
December, 1986 . 
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ADDENDUM TO TRIAL BRIEF 
UTAH STATUTES CITED NO. 1 
GAIL POTTER TESTIMONY NO. 2 
JANA FUCA TESTIMONY NO . 3 
E . L . PACK TESTIMONY NO . 4 
ROBERT BOWLES TESTIMONY NO . 5 
MINUTES OF WEST JORDAN CITY COUNCIL NO. 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NO . 1 
UTAH STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-2-1 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-6 
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-1 
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-4 
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-3 
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed 
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
Hawkins v. Perry (1953) 123 U 16, 253 P 2d 
372. 
Where defendant altered a certificate of 
sale of land by inserting his own name as 
purchaser and the land was not included in 
the decedent's estate which was distributed 
in 1924, there was a constructive trust for the 
benefit of the decedent's heirs and the estate 
could be reopened. Perry v. McConkie (1953) 
1 U 2d 189, 264 P 2d 852. 
A deed given to secure a debt, though abso-
lute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so 
that a trust was created by operation of law 
and, under the express language of this sec-
tion, was not prevented by 25-5-1. Taylor v. 
Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 39, 492 P 2d 1343. 
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove 
a constructive trust or resulting trust since 
they arise by operation of law and are 
expressly excluded from the statute of frauds 
by this section. In re Estate of Hock (1982) 
655 P 2d 1111. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2463; 
C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, § 3918(5). 
Agent's authority. 
In action for specific performance of con-
tract for sale of real property, held in 
absence of evidence showing defendant's 
agent was authorized in writing to sell real 
property or equities taking case out of stat-
ute of frauds, trial court properly granted 
motion for dismissal of action. Lee v. 
Polyhrones (1921) 57 U 401,195 P 201. 
Wills. 
When will is sought to be maintained also 
as a contract, it must satisfy this and suc-
ceeding sections of the statute of frauds. 
Ward v. Ward (1938) 96 U 263, 85 P 2d 635. 
Collateral References. 
Applicability of statute of frauds to con-
tracts to surrender, rescind or abandon 
trusts, 106 ALR 1313,173 ALR 281. 
Character and validity of instrument as 
contract as affected by provision for post-
mortem payment or performance, 1 ALR 2d 
1178. 
Decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath, 
or leave property as compensation for ser-
vices, 106 ALR 742. 
Enforceability, as regards proceeds of sale 
of property, of real estate trust that does not 
satisfy statute of frauds, 154 ALR 385. 
Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving 
rise to trust, 159 ALR 997. 
Trust arising by grantee's oral promise to 
grantor, 35 ALR 280, 45 ALR 851, 80 ALR 
195,129 ALR 689,159 ALR 997. 
If there is no contract there cannot, of 
course, arise any question as to a require-
ment that it should be in writing and sub-
scribed by the party or his agent. Skeen v. 
Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 419,15 P 2d 344. 
Where real estate agents had no express or 
implied authority under listing agreement to 
execute contract of sale of real estate on 
behalf of vendors, latter were not bound by 
the terms of an earnest money agreement. 
Frandsen v. Gerstner (1971) 26 U 2d 180, 487 
P 2d 697. 
There is no requirement that the agent of 
the lessee or assignee be authorized in writ-
ing to execute the lease or assignment. Zeese 
v. Estate of Siegel (1975) 534 P 2d 85. 
Introduction of parol evidence was proper 
to show that agent who made contract in his 
own name was acting for corporate principal, 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Trusts. though absolute in form,' if given to secure a 
Trusts arising by implication or operation debt, is in equity treated as a mortgage — 
of law are expressly excluded from the effects a trust by operation of law. Wasatch Min. Co. 
of the statute; and a deed of conveyance, v. Jennings (1887) 5 U 243,15 P 65. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Every contract for 
the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
in writing. 
27 
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57-3-3 REAL ESTATE 
— Mortgages. 
The matter of priority between successive 
mortgages is governed by general principles of 
mortgage law. This is true as to purchase 
money mortgages. State v. Johnson, 71 Utah 
572, 268 P. 561 (1928). 
— Overlapping conveyances. 
Where deeds involved in two separate con-
veyances contained descriptions of land that 
overlapped, party who first recorded notice of 
purchase prevailed. Wilson v. Schneiter's Riv-
erside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974). 
Recordation as notice. 
One who deals with real property is charged 
with notice of what is shown by the records of 
the county recorder of the county in which the 
real property is situated. Crompton v. Jenson, 
78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931). 
"Recorded." 
There is nothing in this section or § 57-3-3 
which specifically defines what is meant by the 
word "recorded." Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile 
& Inv. Co., 76 Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 98. 
C.J.S. — 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser 
§ 324. 
A.L.R. — Recorded real property instrument 
as charging third party with constructive no-
tice of provisions of extrinsic instrument re-
ferred to therein, 89 A.L.R.3d 901. 
Key Numbers. — Vendor and Purchaser *» 
231(1). 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be recorded 
as provided in this title, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in 
good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any 
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001; 
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of failure to record. 
Priorities. 
— Description of property insufficient. 
— Prior unrecorded conveyance. 
Words and phrases defined. 
— "Conveyance." 
Mortgage. 
— "Recorded." 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where, after mortgage was executed on cer-
tain tract of land, owner executed deed to 
grantee on property not included in mortgage, 
which deed was not recorded, decree in action 
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, includ-
ing part conveyed to grantee, was not binding 
on grantee who was not party to such action. 
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 
P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). 
A judgment lien is subordinate and inferior 
to a deed which predated it whether recorded 
after such judgment or whether not recorded at 
all. Kartchner v. State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 
382, 294 P.2d 790 (1956). 
Where buyers did not record their own con-
veyance, or contract, they did not obtain the 
statutory protection enjoyed by subsequent 
purchasers in good faith and for value against 
unrecorded interests. Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 
P.2d 396 (Utah 1983). 
Priorities. 
— Description of property insufficient 
Although defendant's deed was recorded 
426 
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57-2-1 REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Section 
57-2-1. 
57-2-2. 
57-2-3. 
57-2-4. 
57-2-5. 
57-2-6. 
57-2-7. 
57-2-8. 
57-2-9. 
Manner of acknowledging or proving 
conveyances. 
Who authorized to take acknowledg-
ments. 
Acknowledgment by deputy. 
Taking acknowledgments of persons 
with United States armed 
forces. 
Certificate of acknowledgment. 
Party must be known or identified. 
Form of certificate of acknowledg-
ment. 
When grantor unknown to officer. 
When executed by attorney in fact. 
Section 
57-2-10. 
57-2-11. 
57-2-12. 
57-2-13. 
57-2-14. 
57-2-15. 
57-2-16. 
57-2-17. 
Proof of execution—How made. 
Witness must be known or identi-
fied. 
Certificate of proof by subscribing 
witness. 
Form of certificate of proof. 
When subscribing witness dead-
Proof of handwriting. 
What evidence required for certifi-
cate of proof. 
Subpoena to subscribing witness. 
Disobedience of subpoenaed wit-
ness—Contempt—Proof 
aliunde. 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving convey-
ances. 
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be 
affected shall be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner herein-
after provided. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1984; 
C.L. 1917, § 4884; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-2-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Deed good, either being sufficient if the deed is oth-
Either the acknowledgment or the proving erwise sufficient. Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 
must accompany every deed to make it valid. Utah 205, 14 P. 338 (1887), afTd, 142 U.S. 241, 
Both are not necessary to make it prima facie 12 S.Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 (1891). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledg- C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments §§ 6,7. 
ments § 5. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment«» 3,4. 
57-2-2. Who authorized to take acknowledgments. 
The proof or acknowledgment of every conveyance whereby any real estate 
is conveyed or may be affected shall be taken by some one of the following 
officers: 
(1) If acknowledged or proved within this state, by a judge or clerk of a 
court having a seal, or a notary public, county clerk or county recorder. 
(2) If acknowledged or proved without this state and within any state 
or territory of the United States, by a judge or clerk of any court of the 
United States, or of any state or territory, having a seal, or by a notary 
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57-1-6 REAL ESTATE 
ing to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is 
retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use 
of such words as herein provided. In all cases the interest of joint tenants must 
be equal and undivided. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CL 1907, § 1973; C.L. Cross-References. — Inheritance tax on 
1917, § 4873; R.S 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-5; L. jointly held property, § 59-12-5. 
1953, ch. 93, § 1. Interparty agreements, § 15-3-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint tenancies. 
—Alienation and execution. 
—Judicial sales. 
—Severance by conveyance or sale. 
Preference for tenancy in common. 
Joint tenancies. of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to 
—Alienation and execution. b e f o r t h e b e n e f l t o f a11 covenants. Jolley v. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has C o r r v ' 6 7 1 R 2 d 1 3 9 ( U t a h 1 9 8 3 )-
said that it would assume that "Utah accepts _ s e v e r a n c e by conveyance or sale. 
the general common-law rules relating to joint
 T h e r u l e t h a t a j o i n t t e i s 8 e v e r e d b 
tenancies, including the rules permitting
 Q n e t e n a n t , g c o n v c e l i e 8 n o t o n l to vol. 
alienation of the interest of a joint tenant, and , , . , . , . 
making its property subject to execution and u n t a r y <™v<>yan«*. but also to involuntary 
separate sale." Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ o T / ' l L ,^<. u ^ o ^ 8 , ' 
63 S. Ct. 182, 87 L. Ed., 169, rehearing denied, v ' Corry> 6 7 1 R 2 d 1 3 9 ( U t a h 1983>-
317 U.S. 712, 63 S. Ct. 432, 87 L. Ed. 567
 P r eference for tenancy in common. 
'
1 9 4 3
' - This section expresses the trend away from 
—Judicial sales. the English joint tenancy and in favor of ten-
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obliga- ancy in common. Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase 120 P.2d 327 (1941). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy tenancy by conveyance of divided interest di-
and Joint Ownership § 27. rectly to self, 7 A.L.R.4th 1268. 
C.J.S. — 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 7. Key Numbers. — Tenancy in Common «=» 3. 
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation 
and effect — Interest of person not named in in-
strument. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting 
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may 
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowl-
edged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, 
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have 
had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein 
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PON 57 1-6 
•ovided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in 
ich instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise 
irports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms 
'the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the inter-
jt of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
rantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was 
wiveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed 
y the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting 
)rth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and de-
cribing the property charged with such interest 
History: R.S, 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1975; 
!.L 1917, § 4875; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
8-1-6; L. 1945, ch. 106, § 1; 1947, ch. 97, § I, 
Cross-References. — Acknowledgments 
generally, § 57-2-1 et seq. 
Certified copies of record of conveyance, ad-
nisaion in evidence, § 78-25-13. 
County recorder, § 17-21-1 et seq. 
Fees of recorder, § 21-2-3. 
Judgments, record of as imparting notice, 
17-21-11. 
Recording generally, § 57-3-1 et seq, 
::ismitting documents by telegraph oi 
one, § 69-1-2. 
NO I ES 'hCISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
4,-Vrrwledgmentp 
t notice 
* -:i (mments 
1
 to inquire 
-.ution sales 
—Occupancy an ; possession, 
-Trusts. 
Delivery of deed. 
Effect of failure to record. 
Equitable rights. 
Livery of seizin. 
Mortgages. 
Patents. 
Priorities. 
Recital of consideration. 
Recordation as notice. 
—In general. 
—Forged deed. 
"Recorded" construed. 
Ackno wled gments. 
A deed as between the parties and those hav-
ing notice thereof is good without any acknowl-
edgment, and actual possession constitutes no-
tice. Jordan v. Utah R RM 47 Utah 519, 156 P. 
939 (1916). 
A deed need not be acknowledged to be valid 
between the parties thereto. Mitchell v. 
Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 240 P.2d 970 (1952), 
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee him 
self as notary public is void; thus, a mortgage, 
acknowledged by the mortgagee, though re-
corded, is ineffective for purpose of notice, since 
it is not legally recordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68 
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). See § 57-2-1 et seq. 
Actual notice. 
—Assignments. 
Attaching creditors who had actual notice of 
assignment for benefit of creditors were not in 
position to object that statutory notice of as-
signment was not given. Snyder v. Murdock, 
20 Utah 407, 59 P. 88 (1899), 
-—Duty to inquire. 
Fhe demands of this section are answered if 
a party dealing with the land has information 
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and would, if pursued, lead to ac-
tual knowledge of the state of the title; this is 
38' i 
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ZONING, BUILDING AND PLANNING 10-9-1 
Section Section 
10-9-28. Short title — Definitions. 10-9-30. Violation of chapter or ordinance 
10-9-29. Severability clause — Jurisdiction of punishable as misdemeanor 
commission over public prop- Remedies of municipality and 
erty. owners of real estate. 
ARTICLE 1 
ZONING POWER OF CITIES AND TOWNS 
10-9-1. Power to regulate and restrict height and size of 
buildings and height and location of trees and 
other vegetation — Regulations to encourage use 
of solar and other forms of energy. 
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals and the general welfare 
of the community the legislative body of cities and towns is empowered to 
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and 
other structures, the height and location of trees and other vegetation, the 
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open 
spaces, the density of population and the location and use of buildings, struc-
tures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes. Regulations 
and restrictions of the heights and number of stories of buildings and other 
structures, and the height and location of trees and other vegetation shall not 
apply to existing buildings, structures, trees or vegetation except for new 
growth on such vegetation. These regulations may also encourage energy-effi-
cient patterns of development, the use of solar and other renewable forms of 
energy, and energy conservation and may assure access to sunlight for solar 
energy devices. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 1; R.S. 1933, County zoning and planning, § 17-27-1 et 
15-8-89; L. 1941, ch. 18, § 1; C. 1943, 15-8-89;
 8eq. 
L. 1981, ch. 44, § 1. Lumberyards and combustible materials, 
Amendment Notes. - - The 1981 amend-
 pronibition within fire limits, § 10-8-70. 
ment inserted the height^and location of trees
 M u n i c i p a l panning Enabling Act and 
and other vegetation in the first sentence, and - ... , . ° , , 
added the last two sentences. f ^ Q * thereunder, 
Cross-References. — Airport zoning regu- * 10-9-19 et seq. 
lations, § 2-4-1 et seq. S l u m clearance, §§ 11-15-1 et seq., 11-19-1 
Building and fire regulations, § 10-8-52. et seq. 
Conformity to zoning ordinances of other po- State planning coordinator, § 63-28-1 et seq. 
litical subdivisions, § 11-16-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deed restrictions and covenants. 
Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Gasoline filling and service station. 
Initiative power of the people. 
Judicial review.
 % 
Prior nonconforming use. 
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10-9-4 ( T 1 I K S Wi l l ii " U N -
10-9-4. Planning commission Zoning plan, ordinance, 
maps and recommendations — Certification to 
legislative body — Zoning of municipality. 
In order to more fully avail itself of the pbwers conferred by this chapter to 
the mayor, with the advice and consent of the legislative body, may appoint a 
commission to be known as the planning commission. The planning commis-
sion, through its own initiative may, or by order of the legislative body of the 
municipality shall, make and certify to the legislative body a zoning plan, 
including both the full text of the zoning ordinance and maps, and represent-
ing the planning commission's recommendations for zoning the municipality. 
The legislative body may, after receiving the recommendations of the plan-
ning commission for the zoning of the municipality, divide the municipality 
into districts or zones of such number, shape, and area as it may determine, 
and within such districts may regulate the erection, construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, and uses of buildings and structures, and the uses of land. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 4; R.S. 1933 & and consent < >f the legislative body" for "such 
C. 1943, 15-8-92; L. 1949, ch 15, § 1; 1983, ch. legislative body", 
33, § 5, Cross-References . — Municipal Planning 
Amend.me.nl Notes . - - IThe 1983 amend- Enabling Act and planning commissions there-
men t substituted "the mayor, with the advice under, § 10-9-19 et seq. 
NOTKN TO IIKCISIONS 
Discretion of city council 
Fraternity and sorority houses. 
Spot zoning. 
Discre t ion of city counci l . 
The discretion of the governing bociv ui ;i t •• 
is very extensive with regard to the wisdom f 
the plan, the necessity for the zoning, the num-
ber and the nature of the districts to be cre-
ated, the boundaries thereof and the uses per-
mitted therein. It is the primary duty of the 
city to make the classifications. If a classifica-
tion is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of 
the court will not be substituted for the judg-
ment of the city. In short, unless the action of 
the governing body of the city is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends 
some provision of the Constitution or another 
statute, the court must uphold it, if it is within 
the municipality's grant of power. Marshall v. 
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704. 
149 A.L.R. 282 (1943). 
By the terms of this section, and §§ 10-w i i 
10-9-3, the governing body of a city is granted 
discretionary power to district and zone cities 
for various purposes that are to the public in-
terest; the exercise of that power will not be 
interfered with by the courts unless the discre-
tion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraterr»"v " 
-alt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 
' 9 V-
1 i aiet mtv ami »».* *. 
Ordinance confin. < i 
nity or sorority houses j 
district, to an area not n 
• . . • . ] . . . . > 
is against contentic 
tion against the rig. 
:ses. Phi Kappa Iota Fratem u 
v, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d .77 
. *• t: 
.- :es, to the extent that they 
•a .-.;i .-.i::.iii spot Residential "C" or Resi 
"•mi "B3" districts, did not violate require 
1
 i.r-t of comprehensive zoning plan. Provisions 
creating very small areas for limited business 
Purposes detached from "C" or "B3" districts 
*. -e not objectionable as "spot zoning," or as 
'iilending against the rule that zoning must be 
by districts. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 
1
 >ah H ! M I P ?d 704, 149 A I ,.R. 282 (1943). 
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NO . 2 
GAIL POTTER TESTIMONY 
R. pp 214-217 
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:
 GAIL C. POTTER « i. 
:.;• j • at the instano^ o- rh- defendants 
i * r/inq be-'-1;; i list aaly sworn, was t :<ap .a-.* : , • ; 
J.uiluWS : 
DIRECT EXAM I NAT I ON . ; • • • - •• . 
;
 i' MR. FELTON: 
"it r* ""';a pa me and address 
you 
15 
16 
1 7 
18 
19 
" h e r • : : h . .'• ( a* h< a a : 
1
 i e s i d e n c e . 
1 'i 1 I . a e w s t e r O r i v p , ': i r / : •. 
o k a y , at; 1, v : . ' o t t e r , wiien a4 \ ui a l i a s e d t h i s 
.i,i-i - i i M i' it "ou saw a 7 - E l e v e n s t o r e ? • ' • • ' • 
A Y e s . 
Q Did you make any ; n o u i r \ a s * y . a i p r o p e r t v 
/ -K l e v e n owned ami what • . >• . : . • .. iny . ; 
A Y e s . • • • • • . ' 
Q £ad w o u i u yuu i c i x mc, p l e a s e , wl l a t i n q u i r y yon 
made? 
A 1/y >f a l l , we a s k e - 1 t h o t i t l e company t o 
• a i i * •->*' c a r e t ' s 1 ' *-*" *j -ar<> t h ^ r e was 
r a n j •* \ <-o.a a a a a i a . a t
 ::,_ p i ' M * . : ' l s e m o n t s 
' H i r f ' - and e q r e s s o r any t v p e of " d s e m e n i , We, s e c o n d l y 
-. • < • • ah i t wc w e r e l e a ! ; ^ i u i < - i f 
* •- ha i a s n o w i e a a o oi -a.aw of a n v r i o l - -
 : ; 
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had other than the 6200 South entrance on their property. 
Q 
rights 
A 
0 
do with 
A 
Q 
A 
1 ° 
j A 
1 Q 
As a result of this inquiry, did you learn of any 
that 7-Eleven asserted? 
None. 
Mr; Potter, is this corner—what were you going to 
this property, your property? 
Develop a shopping center on 5.9200 acres. 
Is that shopping center under construction? 
Yes. 
A portion of it? , , , ... 
Y e s . . .• - : I, 
Does this property which is the subject of this 
| suit affect your plans for the property—is it important to 
the pro 
A 
ject? 
Very definitely. 
MR. DART: I will object on the basis of rele-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 vancy of what the plans of this buyer is going to be as to 
18 that property. 
19 THE COURT: Probably isn't important. 
20 Q (By Mr. Felton) Mr. Potter, do you know of the 
21 approximate dimension of this parcel of property that 
22 7-Eleven is using? 
23 A Approximately 87 and some fraction times a hundred 
24 and twenty-nine foot depth off of 62nd South. 
25 Q Do you have the value as to the rental value? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 i. 
^ • Rental value? ; ; • •• * ; . 
Q • Y e s . ' • -'• ' : « L > - •. • 
MR. DART: Object en -he basis r : jcl; of founda -
5 I MR. FELTON: I Itah ] aw provi des that an owner may 
6 testify. ' • ' • 
7 " ' 11 JRT i Yen i i i iii\,/ ai lswer 
g I A ! Bw 1 hi \ i * i k ' s s s Y e s . ; 
9 I Q [Dy m . r t ! r r ' Y! :* - * e r. \ ^ -> *r l 
-- ' A There w o u b i ee ' . ^ t : . >:. .>n;ru :: » , n s e e L .*•• 
i ' r - va i; , o n e , t j k i n a i h - t o t a! sen; i r e r o e t a q e of fw.-
' t ,- • e u i Lne 
J -ve ra 1 n . ' u i . 
IH IiiE COURfT - ^ ^-- • • ' • ^ r n o t y e \ \e inswer -; n ^t r - s i o r 
IQ .q i v e \. ; • 
c i f i e parLic : - f ; e- i . • • • • • • >. . • 
• ' MK. FEIYY'Y ." ' wiiaL he i s * •' . : ri : auOuL. * 
H e ' s j u s t ° x o l a i n . ' , : i * : s a r r i v i n a .-
15HF CQtY<T: (]\ ve us a f icjur >. 
A • 'QUI; no: * e >-|-:u ^ i T u or 
t h a t p r o p e i t. v wow: •> :A. \ s a ronn; : * -\ • . ;•. 
be a r o u n d ; - *o 2 - 0 0 . . • -
18 
17. 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 Ye s t r i c k e n w i t h o u r s u t i i c i e n i : •-undct t. ..on and b a s i s at t. h 
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i THE COURT: If he owns the property;, I think he is 
permitted to testify. The fact that he owns it would be 
sufficient foundation. I have never understood the rule but 
I think that is what it is. 
Q (By Mr. Felton) Has 7-Eleven been utilizing that 
7 
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16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
property since you purchased it in June of '84? 
A Yes. • •; , 
Q And have you on occasion seen the property? 
A Yes. • : • 
Q Okay, you have seen what kind—what kind of use 
is going on? . • • - • • 
A A combination of used car lot sales. , v -
Q What do you mean? 
A Well, there have consistently been parked the time 
I have seen it numerous cars parked on the strip with for 
sale signs on them and as of yesterday when I.came by there 
were either five or six parked on there with for sale signs 
on it, so they have been using it. 
Q Are there any parking stalls on the property? 
A There's been some chalk—some lines painted for 
parking, yes. 
Q At any time has 7-Eleven or Southland Corporation 
or any other person had your permission to utilize that 
property? 
A No. 
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1 THE COURT: Sometimes it does. 
2 MR. FELTON: I will submit it. 
3 THE COURT: Depends on who is asking the question. 
4
 I will hear it. 
5 Q (By Mr. Felton) What did she tell you? 
6 A We had a couple conversations prior to the closing 
7 that related to the 7-Eleven issue and one conversation was 
8 she had contacted somebody from the 7-Eleven Corporation, 
9 Southland Corporation and they were going to see if they did 
10 have any records or anything that would pertain to any rights) 
11 that they may have over that property, and in getting back 
12 to her, in a subsequent conversation, she said that they 
13 could not find any record of any entitlement of that prop-
14 erty to them. 
15 Q As a result, I take it your father bought the 
16 property? • 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q You closed it for him? 
19 A I closed it with Bob Bowles. I was the power of 
20 attorney. 
21 Q You had power of attorney? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q For your father? 
24 A Yes. 
25 MR. FELTON: No further questions. 
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1 intends to do with the property seven years afterrthe;pur- -
2 chase by Southland Corporation. We have a drawing that was 
3 done after the fact by Mr. Gini that shows the location of 
4
 the Southland store, the size of the lot and in conjunction, 
5 I don't have any objection to that, anything that brings into) 
6 play as this exhibit does with all the architects1 or plan-
7 ners' renditions on it. It is inappropriate. I would ask 
8 that that— 
9 1 MR. FELTON: At this point, Your Honor, we would 
10 only ask to allow Mr. Pack to refer to it for purposes of 
11 showing where the property is. We would not request its 
12 introduction. 
13 THE COURT: I will permit its use . for that purpose. 
14 Q (By Mr. Felton) You then sometime,later bought 
15 another 20 feet from them; is that right? 
16 A Yes. . :..••:.••.. . » , \ . . 
17 Q It is on this side of the property? 
18 A On the south side. > .\ . » . . . t . * « • 
19 Q That's here? (Indicating) ' . •; . -..•$., 
20 A Yes. ., . , i v : ...:' ; 
21 Q And the property in dispute sits where I am point-
22 ing, does it not? i .•.<_. . *. 
2 3 A Y e s . ,;. ; .. ••;.-.. 
24 Q Did you ever pay them any additional sums for any 
25 of this property? ,.. -. s r . 
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Q To your knowledge did they ever pay or did you 
ever convey an easement to them across that property? 
A No. . 
Q When you are talking about accesses in the scheme 
of things, are you--you are not necessarily talking about 
this access right in front of their store to the shopping 
center? 
A When you are developing shopping centers you draw 
in there only the final approved plans exactly where the ap-
proaches are. But in the schematic drawings you just pencil 
in where you feel they ought to be. . ' * •' . 
0 Was it ever your intention to give 7-Eleven an 
access right in front of their store— 
MR. DART: Objection to what their intention may 
be.
 : .-...u , . • -.. • ' '• • 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. DART: I ask that the answer be stricken. I 
object to what his intention is--
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The 
answer is in. 
MR. FELTON: No further questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DART: 
Q Mr. Bowles, when you talked in your board meetings 
about the possibility of putting a gas station on that 
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CITY COUNCIL HELD AT THE CITY OFFICES ON DECEMBER 9% 1975 
The meeting commenced at 8i05 p.m 
Members present/ Mayor Junius H. Burton. Lawrence Hunt/ 
Grandale Finlayson John Price and Glen 
Moosman 
Others present: Glenden H. Leak, A, Mecham Paul H; Gini, 
Vicky Miller, Sally Wood, Jack A, Blank, 
C. Brian Morrison' Robert I. Bowles. Nick 
Colessides and Murial Andersen 
The opening prayer was offered by"Glen Moosman. 
The minutes of the meeting of November 25, 1975, were reviewed 
by the Council and approved as recorded. 
Jack Blank requested permission to have an office in his | home at 7174 South 2180 West for C & B Cleaning Co. This 
jwill be an office location only and there will be no machinery 
I or equipment kept at the home. Mr. Hunt.stated that Planning 
I and Zoning had recommended that this Conditional Use Permit 
J be granted. Mr. Hunt said that if the Council approves this 
j it will be on the condition that if any valid complaints are 
ireceived the business will have to be discontinued. Mr._ 
j Hunt moved that the Conditional Use Permit be granted on the 
I above mentioned condition. Mr. Price seconded the motion and 
it carried unanimously, 
]Mayor Burton read a notice of public hearing to rezone 
;property located at 6200 South 3655 West-from RIO to CN 
for the purpose of developing a shopping center. The public 
hearing was opened for discussion. Mr. Gini showed on a map 
jwhere the shopping center would be located in conjunction with 
'the Dixie Valley Subdivision. He said that they planned to have 
a mini-mall type development with grocery, laundromat, drug store 
professional offices, etc, Mr. Hunt said that Planning and Zonin 
had recommended that this zone change be granted but that there 
should be no entrance to the shopping center from 6 200 South. 
Mr. Gini said that their plans had been changed to move this 
•entrance. He also stated that final development plans would begi 
!
 immediately if the zoning is granted. Bob Bowles said that the 
shopping center would be developed professionally and would not 
be just gobbed up. Mr. Hunt mentioned that all construction plan! 
would have to be approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
All notices of the public hearing were determined to be in order. 
Mr. Finlayson moved that the Council rezbne the following*descirib< 
property from RIO to CN on the recommendation of Planning and 
^Zoning, Mr. Price seconded the motion and it carried unanimously 
Property zoned CN 
Beginning at a point which is S0°00,55" E 33.00 ft. 
from the North Quarter Corner of Section 20. T2S 
R1W, SLB & M. and running thence S0°00,55M E 840.28 
ft. to the North line of Dixie Valley No. 9; thence 
S89°59,05n W331.1 ft; thence N0°01,50M W 840.28 ft-
thence East along the South line of 6200 South Street^,^ 
-- -* • -
1
-- —-:-*- ~* K^inninn Containsfe61^92acresV 
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